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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Robert Leroy Huck appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.

After his motion to

suppress was denied, Mr. Huck pleaded guilty and preserved the right to appeal from
the denial of his motion. The district court imposed unified sentences of seven years,
with three years fixed, and 180 days, and it retained jurisdiction. Mr. Huck appeals, and
he asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts are taken from the district court's findings of fact on
Mr. Huck's motion to suppress.

On June 16, 2011, Officers Kelly Montoya, Jim

Schiffler, Guy Borgeau and Officer Phillips, all from the Boise Police Department, were
working together as a "Direct Patrol Team."

(R., p.126.)

Shortly before 7:30 p.m.,

Officer Phillips received information regarding a drug transaction occurring in the
Albertson's parking lot at the corner of Overland and Vista in Boise. (R., p.126.) Officer
Phillips dispatched the other officers who were each in separate patrol vehicles to
respond to the scene. (R., p.126.) He informed the other officers that Mr. Huck may be
in possession of narcotics and provided a description of Mr. Huck and the vehicle he
was driving. (R., p.126.) Other than the information received from Officer Phillips, the
three other officers had no independent information regarding the situation. (R., p.126.)
In responding to the scene, Officer Montoya observed Mr. Huck driving westbound on
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Overland and proceeded to follow the vehicle from a distance of about two car lengths.
(R., p.126.) The other officers followed behind at various distances. (R., p.126.)
At approximately 7:30 p.m., Officer Montoya witnessed Mr. Huck's vehicle make
a northbound turn onto Roosevelt Street. (R., p.126.) He proceeded to initiate a traffic
stop based on his observation that Mr. Huck failed to utilize his turn signal for the period
of time or distance as required by Idaho Code § 49-808(2) prior to making the turn.
(R., pp.126-27.) Officers Schiffler and Borgeau arrived and stopped at the scene of the
traffic stop within a few seconds of the stop.

(R., p.127.) Officer Montoya contacted

Mr. Huck in his vehicle, informed him of the reason for the traffic stop, and obtained his
driver's license.

(R., p.127.)

He told Mr. Huck that when making the turn onto

Roosevelt Street he did not engage the turn signal until he was already into the turn.
(R., p.127.)

After returning to his vehicle and running Mr. Huck's information through
dispatch, Officer Montoya asked Mr. Huck if he had any problem if he searched the
vehicle. (R., p.127.) Mr. Huck refused the request, stating that it was not his vehicle.
(R., p.127.) Officer Montoya then asked Officer Schiffler to write the traffic citation while

he went to retrieve his K-9 drug dog, Remco. (R., p.127.)
After returning with the drug dog, Officer Montoya advised Mr. Huck that he was
going to use the dog to conduct a sniff around the exterior of the vehicle and directed
Mr. Huck to exit the vehicle and stand over next to Officer Borgeau. (R., p.127.) Officer
Borgeau also directed Mr. Huck to exit the vehicle and directed him not to put his hands
in his pockets. (R., p.127.) Officer Borgeau testified that Mr. Huck appeared nervous
and was hesitant to exit the vehicle and, prior to exiting, rolled up the window and
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locked the door. (R., p.127.) Officer Borgeau ordered Mr. Huck to place the keys on
the top of the car explaining that it was a "safety issue." (R., p.127.) Mr. Huck complied
but questioned the request, arguing that it was not his car. Officer Borgeau testified that
after Mr. Huck exited the vehicle, he turned away from him and toward the car, dropping
his hands down towards the front of his waistband area and out of sight. (R., p.127.)
This sudden movement immediately led Officer Borgeau to suspect Mr. Huck was either
attempting to conceal evidence or retrieve a weapon. (R., p.127.) In response, Officer
Borgeau grabbed Mr. Huck by the forearm and led the Defendant to the rear of the
vehicle for the purpose of conducting a pat-down search of Mr. Huck. Prior to
conducting the pat-down, Officer Borgeau asked Mr. Huck if he had anything on his
person he needed to know about, including "weapons, needles or anything that would
hurt him."

(R., p.127.) Mr. Huck responded he had no weapons or needles. When

asked if he had "something else" on his person, Mr. Huck admitted to having
methamphetamine in his pocket. (R., p.127.)
Meanwhile, the dog's sniff of the vehicle's exterior resulted in an alert near the
driver-side door. (R., p.128.) Officer Montoya then proceeded to deploy his drug dog to
conduct a sniff of the interior of the vehicle, resulting in the dog alerting to a black bag
sitting on the passenger seat. (R., p.128.) A subsequent search of the black bag by
Officer Montoya revealed seven syringes and a digital scale. (R., p.128.)

Mr. Huck was

subsequently placed under arrest. At no time prior to the arrest was Mr. Huck read his

Miranda 1 rights.

(R., p.128.)

The traffic stop until the time of the arrest lasted

approximately ten (10) minutes.

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Mr. Huck was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession
of drug paraphernalia. (R., p.30.) The State subsequently sought a persistent violator
enhancement, which was granted.

(R., pp.50, 58.)

Mr. Huck then filed a motion to

suppress, asserting that: (1) the State lacked probable cause to conduct a traffic stop;
(2) there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to remove Mr. Huck from his vehicle;
(3) Mr. Huck's detention was prolonged; (4) law enforcement failed to advise Mr. Huck
adequately of his M;randa rights; and (5) there was no evidence of the K-9's
qualifications. (R., pp.51-52.)
The district court denied the motion to suppress.

(R., p.126.)

Mr. Huck

subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and possession of
drug paraphernalia and preserved the right to appeal from the denial of his motion to
suppress.

(R., p.141.)

The district court imposed unified sentences of seven years,

with three years fixed, and 180 days, and it retained jurisdiction. (R., p.156.) Mr. Huck
appealed. (R., p.153.) He asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress.

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Huck's motion to suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Huck's Motion To Suppress

A

Introduction
Mr. Huck asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

because both the stop and the search of his vehicle were illegal.

8.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Holland,

135 Idaho 159 (2000). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the
appellate court should "accept the trial court's findings of fact which were supported by
substantial evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found." Id. "Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given
to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion
of the trial court." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).

C.

The District Court Erred VVhen It Denied Mr. Huck's Motion To Suppress
Mr. Huck's motion to suppress asserted five grounds for suppression, which the

district court addressed in turn. Mr. Huck will address the grounds in the same order on
appeal. 2

2

One of the bases upon which Mr. Huck challenged the search of his vehicle was the
allegation that the drug dog was not qualified. This argument was based on the fact
that no evidence of the dog's training or experience had been disclosed. Because the
dog's qualifications were addressed at the hearing, Mr. Huck does not raise this claim
on appeal.
6

1.

Illegal Stop

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

The Idaho Constitution contains a

virtually identical provision to protect its citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures. ID. CONST. art. I,§ 17; State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 22 (Ct. App. 2002).
Searches and seizures without a valid warrant are presumed unreasonable and violate
both constitutional provisions. State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 640 (2003). If evidence
is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the
evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of
the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The purpose of
these constitutional rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise
of discretion by governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and
security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App.
2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)).
A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is therefore subject to
constitutional limits.

State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 737 (Ct. App. 2005); State v.

Roark, 140 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2004). An officer may conduct an investigatory
stop without violating a individual's constitutional rights if under the totality of the
circumstances the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime.
(Ct. App. 2003).

State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 379

When challenged, the State bears the burden to prove a valid

investigatory stop. State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 264 (Ct. App. 2001 ). The State must
demonstrate that at the time of the stop the officer possessed reasonable, articulable
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suspicion that the person is engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). "The officer's suspicion must be more than a mere

hunch. . ." State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 515 (2001 ). '"Based upon that whole
picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."'

Wilson v. Idaho

Transportation Department 136 Idaho 270, 274 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 499 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981)).

In this case, the State asserted that Officer Montoya initiated the traffic stop
because Mr. Huck had failed to engage his turn signal prior to turning onto Roosevelt
Street. Idaho Code § 49-808(2) provides:
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be
given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances,
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle
before turning.
I.C. § 49-808(2).

The district court found that there was no evidence that Overland

Road constituted a "controlled-access highway," and thus the applicable law required
that Mr. Huck engage his turn signal not less than one hundred feet before turning.
(R., p.129.) Mr. Huck does not dispute this finding.

The district court noted that there was conflicting evidence on when Mr. Huck
activated his turn signal. The court found that in the audio of the stop, Officer Montoya
informed Mr. Huck that he engaged the signal "immediately when you were already into
your turn,"

and that during the suppression hearing, Officer Montoya testified that

Mr. Huck did not engage his signal until he was already into his turn. (R., p.129.) In the
audio, Mr. Huck stated that he engaged the signal two to three seconds prior to the turn
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if he was lucky, and at the suppression hearing, Mr. Huck testified that he engaged the
signal two or three seconds prior to turning. (R., p.130.) 3
The district court found Officer Montoya to be more credible because his
testimony was corroborated by the audio of the stop and because Mr. Huck's
recollection lacked the same degree of certainty. (R., p.130.) Mindful of the fact that
credibility determinations are left to the discretion of the trial court, Mr. Huck asserts that
his testimony was credible and consistent with the audio as well. Mr. Huck consistently
maintained that he signaled about 2-3 seconds prior to turning, and he asserts that the
district court should have accepted his testimony.
If Mr. Huck's testimony is accepted, this Court should hold that the stop was
illegal. The district court held that, even if Mr. Huck was correct and he activated his
turn signal when he insisted he did, Mr. Huck would have been about 102.6 feet away
from the turn when he activated his signal.

(R., p.130.) The district court concluded

that such evidence would give Officer Montoya reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle
to investigate further. The court stated:
Put differently, a finding that the Defendant engaged his turn signal 102.6
prior to making the turn would suffice for purposes of defeating a traffic
citation for failing to properly signal but the close proximity to the 100 foot
requirement puts the stop well within the margin of reasonableness for
purposes of initiating the stop for a suspected violation.
(R., p.130.)

Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch or "inchoate or

unparticularized suspicion."

State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009) (citing

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)).

3

Officer Montoya's estimate amounted

While there is an audio recording of the stop (Exhibit 1), there is no video recording.
Thus, the only evidence concerning when Mr. Huck activated his signal comes from the
testimony of Officer Montoya and Mr. Huck.
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only to a hunch that any law had been violated.

City of Chippewa Falls v.

Hein, 788 N.W.2d 384 (Ct. App. Wisc. 2010) ("Finally, we agree Kelm's speed estimate
is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because the record is devoid of any
testimony or evidence to substantiate the reliability of that observation.")

When

Mr. Huck signaled, Officer Montoya had only a hunch that the signal might have been
late. Officer Montoya, therefore, did not possess reasonable, articulable suspicion that
Mr. Huck failed to engage his signal properly.

2.

Removal From The Vehicle

Both the United States Supreme Court and Idaho courts have held that a police
order to exit a vehicle is a de minimis intrusion into a driver's personal liberty.

See

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); State v. Metzger, 144 Idaho 397, 401
(Ct. App. 2007); State v. !twin, 143 Idaho

02, 105 (Ct. App. 2006). "Based on Mimms

and Wilson, we have expressed the general rule that as a matter of course in a valid
traffic stop, a police officer may order the occupants of a vehicle to exit or remain
inside." !twin, 143 Idaho at 105 (emphasis added). "Thus given our ... analysis in !twin,
within [law enforcement's] power to order occupants out of a vehicle during a legitimate
traffic stop, an officer may open the vehicle door himself." Metzger, 144 Idaho at 144
(emphasis added).
In denying the motion to suppress, the district court held that, because the stop
was valid, it was permissible for Officer Bourgeau to order Mr. Huck to exit the vehicle.
(R., p.131.) As set forth above, the stop in this case was illegal. Therefore, Officer
Bourgeau's order to Mr. Huck to exit his vehicle following the illegal stop violated
Mr. Huck's 4th Amendment rights.
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3.

Miranda Violation

Pursuant to Miranda, "an individual held for interrogation must be clearly
informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during interrogation." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966). Miranda warnings
are required where a suspect is "in custody," a fact determined by "whether there is a
'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a
formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (percuriam) (quoting
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)). To determine whether

custody has attached, "a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation." Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). The test is an
objective one and "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's
position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442
(1984).
When considering whether an individual is in custody, this Court, "must consider
all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519,
523 (2002) (quoting State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811,816 (Ct. App. 1997)). The Court in
Berkemer considered a variety of factors: the short duration of the stop, the modest

number of questions, and the visibility of the stop. Berkemer, 468 U.S at 441-42. In
addition, the Court noted that "[a]t no point during that interval was respondent informed
that his detention would not be temporary." Id. The burden of showing custody rests on
the defendant seeking to exclude evidence based on a failure to administer Miranda
warnings. State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577 (2010).
The district court's findings of fact related to this issue are as follows:
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Officer Borgeau testified that from the time of the stop to the arrest took
less than 10 minutes. This is consistent with the audio of the stop from the
time officer Montoya made contact with the Defendant up until the
Defendant was placed under arrest. Officer Borgeau testified at the
suppression hearing that an average traffic stop lasts approximately 10
minutes. Officer Montoya testified that the average time for a stop takes
about 10-15 minutes. Therefore, the duration of the detention prior to the
arrest, being consistent with the average amount of time necessary for
such a stop, did not exceed beyond that necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop. As discussed elsewhere in this opinion, this is true
even with the use of the Drug Dog. As to visibility the stop was made at
approximately 7:30 p.m. on Roosevelt Street near the intersection of
Overland Road and Roosevelt. Both Overland Road and Roosevelt Street
are relatively busy streets. There is no evidence in the record to suggest
that the Defendant was stopped in an area of Roosevelt Street that was
not visible to motorists passing by on either Roosevelt or Overland.
(R., pp.132-33.) The court then cited to a list of questions Mr. Huck was asked prior to
admitting that he had methamphetamine in his pocket. (R., p.133.) The court found the
number of questions asked to be modest and consistent with a standard frisk
procedure. (R., p.133.)
As Mr. Huck argued to the district court, Officer Bourgeau asked Mr. Huck if he
"had anything dangerous on his person so that he could safely conduct a Terry search
despite the fact that Mr. Huck denied having any weapons. Officer Bourgeau continued
to ask Mr. Huck what else he had on his person. At this point, there [were] at least three
officers on scene, Mr. Huck [was] not free to leave, and he [was] being interrogated."
(R., pp.83-84.) Mr. Huck therefore asserts that he was in custody because he had been
ordered out of the vehicle, frisked despite denying he had weapons, and there were
three officers on the scene. Mr. Huck therefore asserts that the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress on this basis.

12

The Stop Was Unreasonably Extended
Mr. Huck challenged the search of his vehicle on the basis that the stop was
unreasonably prolonged by the time the drug dog alerted on the vehicle. The district
court held: 1) Mr. Huck lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle; and 2)
the stop was not unreasonably prolonged. (R., pp.135, 136.) Mr. Huck will first address
the standing issue.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the test for determining whether

a defendant has the "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends
. . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 (1978).

Therefore, the question in this case is whether Mr. Huck had a privacy

interest in the vehicle he was driving.
In F?akas, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that standing does not
turn on ownership.

Rakas held, "[The] capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth

Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether
the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. In this case, there is no dispute
that Mr. Huck had permission from the owner of the vehicle to drive it.
Federal circuit courts of appeal have routinely held that non-owners of
automobiles who are legitimately driving those cars have standing to contest
governmental searches of those vehicles. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d
546, 548 (11th Cir. 1987) (driver of car borrowed from friend has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the car); United States v. Valdez Hocker, 333 F.3d 1206, 1209-
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1211 (10th Cir. 2003) (driver of car borrowed from relative of owner believed to have
authority to loan car out has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car); United
States v. Portillo, 633 F.1313, 1316-1317 (9th Cir. 1980) (driver of car borrowed from
friend has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car, but passenger does not);
United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 779 n.1 (8th Cir. 1983) (driver of car borrowed
from nephew's roommate, where driver has borrowed same car on prior occasions, has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car); United States v. Walker, 237 F.3d 845,
848-849 (7th Cir. 2001) (authorized driver of rental car has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the car); United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 14'17-14'19 (7th Cir. 1990)
(driver of borrowed car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car); United
States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475, 483 n.11 (7th Cir. 1984) (unlicensed driver, as well as
his passenger, of car borrowed from

a close relative,

both have reasonable

expectations of privacy in the car); United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438, 442-443 (3rd
Cir. 2000) (driver of car borrowed from friend and driven for multiple weeks has
reasonable expectation of privacy in car); United States v. Ponce, 947 F.2d 646, 649
(2nd Cir. 1991) ("To mount a challenge to a search of a vehicle, defendants must show,
among other things, a legitimate basis for being in it, such as permission from the
owner."); United States v. Pena, 961 F.2d 333, 337 (2nd Cir. 1992) ("It is not the law,
however, that only the owner of a vehicle may have a Fourth Amendment privacy
interest therein that is protected against governmental invasion. Rather, the borrower of
an automobile can possess such an interest."). Mr. Huck asserts the fact that he was
given permission to drive the vehicle from the owner, by itself, is sufficient to confer
standing to challenge the search.
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In the context of rental cars, the Court of Appeals has adopted a totality of the
circumstances test to determine whether a non-renter has standing to challenge a
search. See State v. Cutler, 144 Idaho 272 (Ct. App. 2007). In Cutter the court adopted

a standard from the Sixth Circuit, which focuses on factors such as: (1) whether the
defendant had a driver's license; (2) the relationship between the unauthorized driver
and the lessee; (3) the driver's ability to present rental documents; (4) whether the driver
had the lessee's permission to use the car; and (5) the driver's relationship with the
rental company. Id. at 275. Judge Lansing wrote separately,
to express my view that in the vast majority of cases, the question
whether the driver of a rental car had direct permission to use the car
from the lessee or from a contractually authorized driver will be
dispositive of the standing question. The existence of such
permission should ordinarily be sufficient to confer a privacy interest
upon the driver if and to the same extent that the lessee possesses
such a privacy interest. Only in extraordinary circumstances would I hold
that a driver who did not obtain permission from the lessee or other
authorized driver could have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
vehicle.

Id. at 276.

Surely, if a lessee can confer a privacy interest by giving a third party

permission to use the automobile, the owner of the automobile can as well.
The district court made the following factual findings concerning this issue:
In this case, the Defendant testified that the vehicle he was driving
belonged to relatives of his wife. The Defendant testified that he was given
limited permission to drive the vehicle from the Albertson's parking lot to
home, which would take about twenty minutes and that he did not have
permission to drive the car wherever he wanted. He further testified that
he did not have authorization to consent to a search of the vehicle, which
is consistent with the statements made by the Defendant on the audio of
the stop.
(R., pp.135-36.) As set forth above, Mr. Huck asserts that the fact that he was a
permissive driver, by itself, should confer standing.

However, if a totality of the

circumstances test is used, he asserts that he still had standing to challenge the search.
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The district court focused on the limited permission to only drive the vehicle
home and the fact that Mr. Huck informed the officers that he was told not to consent to
any search. The fact that Mr. Huck was told not to permit any searches of the car, far
from indicating that he had no expectation of privacy, establishes that he did have an
expectation of privacy because the one power he was given from the owner was to
exclude others, including the police, from entering the vehicle. This is the hallmark of a
privacy interest and it demonstrates that Mr. Huck had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the vehicle. Thus, the district court erred by concluding that Mr. Huck lacked
standing.
Regarding the prolonged detention, the United States Supreme Court has stated
that an investigative detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). See
also State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992). An individual "may not be detained even
momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Royer, 460 U.S. at
498.
These same standards apply where the detention at issue is a traffic stop. See,
e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct.App. 2005). "The question whether an
investigative detention is reasonable requires a dual inquiry into (1) whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it is reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."

Id.

While the

purpose of a stop is not inevitably fixed at the point of the initiation of the traffic stop,
and may evolve based upon additional information coming to light, any extension of the
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detention must be carefully tailored to the underlying justification of the stop. Id. at 562563.
The district court made the following factual findings regarding the prolonged
detention:
In this case, Officer Montoya had the Drug Dog with him when he initiated
the traffic stop. As a result, there was no delay in the duration of the stop
to wait for a dog to arrive. Furthermore, the sniff was conducted while a
citation was being prepared by one of the other officers. See e.g.
Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362-63, 17 P.3d at 307-308 (holding that it is
permissible for one officer to conduct a drug dog sniff while another officer
"was busy checking on [the driver's] status and writing out a citation").
Therefore, the stop did not last longer than was necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop.
(R., p.136.) While it is true that Officer Montoya had the drug dog with him and another

officer had been delegated the responsibility for the citation, as Mr. Huck argued, that
officer never spoke with Mr. Huck and never issued a citation to Mr. Huck. (R., p.86.)
Further, the audio of the stop reveals that, after checking Mr. Huck's license and
suspension and discovering that Mr. Huck had a criminal history, Officer Montoya
questioned Mr. Huck regarding that history, even though this was not related to the
purpose of the stop. (State's Exhibit 1.)
Mr. Huck acknowledges that the Court of Appeals has held, "brief inquiries not
otherwise related to the initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee's
Fourth Amendment rights.

State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362 (Ct. App. 2000)

Other cases have also sanctioned brief questioning on matters unrelated to the traffic
stop where the questioning was supported by the officer's specific, personalized
knowledge of the defendant or of circumstances amounting to reasonable suspicion.
See State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 984-985 (Ct. App. 2003) (identifying ten separate
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factors within the officer's knowledge that provided reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity). Here, however, the officer possessed no such information, only that
another officer believed Mr. Huck may have possessed narcotics.

In this case,

Mr. Huck asserts that there was no cause to question him regarding his criminal history,
and that the stop has been unreasonably prolonged by the time the drug dog alerted to
the vehicle.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Huck respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress.
DATED this 8th day of January, 2012.

l
JUSTI~ M. '~URTIS
Deput/~tate)Appellate Public Defender

·---

18

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of January, 2013, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
ROBERT LEROY HUCK
INMATE #20426
ICIO
381 WEST HOSPITAL DR
OROFIN ID 83544
ERIC J WILDMAN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KIMBERLY SIMMONS
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORI\IEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JMC/eas

19

